IAM policy evaluation combines policy types by union or by intersection, and a deny wins
Facts read 16 Nov 2026. Page reviewed 16 Nov 2026.
AWS evaluates a request in three steps: authentication, processing the request context, and applying policy logic. Policies that grant combine as a union. Limiting policies such as permissions boundaries, SCPs and RCPs intersect with them, and an explicit deny overrides every allow. This page restates the AWS documentation read on 16 Nov 2026.
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AWS evaluates every request in three steps
When an AWS service receives a request, AWS first authenticates the principal, if necessary. AWS notes that some services, such as Amazon S3, allow some requests from anonymous users. It then processes the request context to decide which policies apply. Finally the enforcement code evaluates all policy types, and the order of policies affects how they are evaluated.
The document history records that on 30 Jan 2025 AWS updated the evaluation logic documentation with improved flow charts and clearer explanations of how AWS decides to allow or deny a request.
Four combinations cover most cases
AWS describes four combinations. Each answers what happens when one policy type meets another.
| Combination | Result per AWS | Deny behavior |
|---|---|---|
| Identity-based with resource-based, same account | Union: allowed if either policy allows | An explicit deny in either overrides the allow |
| Identity-based with permissions boundary | Intersection of the two | An explicit deny in either overrides the allow |
| Identity-based with SCP or RCP, no resource-based policy | Intersection: the action must be allowed by all three | An explicit deny in the identity policy, SCP or RCP overrides the allow |
| Role session with session policy | Intersection of the session policy and identity policies | Session policies limit and never grant |
Resource-based policies sometimes bypass limits on the identity
AWS qualifies the intersection rule in the permissions boundaries documentation. Within the same account, a resource-based policy that grants permissions to an IAM user ARN is not limited by an implicit deny in an identity-based policy or a permissions boundary. A resource-based policy that grants permissions to an IAM role ARN is limited by an implicit deny in a permissions boundary or session policy. A resource-based policy that grants permissions to a role session ARN grants permissions directly to the assumed session, and these are not limited by an implicit deny in an identity-based policy, a permissions boundary or a session policy.
The practical result is that reading only the identity-based policy and the boundary does not show everything a principal can reach. A bucket policy that names a role session can grant access that the role's own policies never mention.
Cross-account access needs two allows
When the principal and the resource sit in different accounts, AWS says the resource-based policy naming the principal is only half of the trust relationship. An identity-based policy in the principal's account must also grant access. In the same account, a resource-based policy that names the principal is enough. The policy types page shows which types grant.
Organization policies sit above the account
SCPs and RCPs set maximum permissions and grant nothing. AWS states that SCPs do not affect users or roles in the management account, only member accounts, and that the effective permissions are the intersection of what SCPs and RCPs allow and what identity-based and resource-based policies allow. For an SCP written as an allow list, AWS says the default Allow * policy must not still be attached to the root, OU or account, or the allow list has no effect.
The root user is also covered: if the account belongs to an organization, SCPs and RCPs for that account affect the root user.
The workbench reads the pieces and does not run the evaluation
The workbench on this site does not run these steps against an account. It reads a policy and reports what that single policy grants and what it fails to guard. An allow in one policy is a necessary part of the answer and never the whole answer, because a boundary, an SCP, an RCP, a session policy or an explicit deny elsewhere can remove it. The simulator page explains the AWS tool that does apply the logic to an account's policies.
Related pages
Sources
- Policy evaluation logic, read 16 Nov 2026
- Permissions boundaries for IAM entities, read 16 Nov 2026
- Policies and permissions in AWS Identity and Access Management, read 16 Nov 2026
- Service control policies, read 16 Nov 2026
- SCP syntax, read 16 Nov 2026
- Document history for IAM, read 16 Nov 2026
Last reviewed 16 Nov 2026.